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dapper and conservative, wearing formal tails and neatly sculptured saltand-pepper coiffure - giving an appearance, however, which was thought
in some circles to be somewhat less riske
than the occasion called for. The rumor
that Mr. Brown had not worn boots
couk1 not be confirmed.
Mr. Dennis Sweeney, current Chief
Attorney of the Administrative Law Unit,
also appeared at the counsel table. Although it was originally thought that he
was aiding Mr. Brown, close observation
revealed that he did nothing at all.
Gregory
Norton - himself attended the hearing, despite a Baltimore Sun report that he couldn't attend.
(All of which goes to prove the danger of
writing news stories in advance. A risk
which this correspondent will never be
accused of taking.) As it was, Joe "Wild
Turkey" Rohr and Gordon "Madman"
Berman, realizing that it was too late to
get their names in the Sun, thought they
might curry favor with the News American by driving Gregory Norton to
Washington and provingtheSun wrong.
This scheme failed.
Gregory was qUietly attending school
when these two arrived at the recreation
yard and lured him into their car with
tales of important doings in Washington.
Although Gregory did not seem to understand the subtleties of the arguments
on his constitutional claim on the merits,
he seemed enraptured by the hour of
debate on the jurisdictional issue.
The Justices must be criticized for the
lack of color and originality in their apparel. How long the federal judiciary will
continue to follow their lead in these
matters is now an open question. One
would have thought that the new year,
and a new Justice, would have brought
some bright new changes in the appearance of the Court, but the minor variations on the same basic black midi are a
real disappointment.
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THE UNITED STATES
MARITIME INDUSTRY:

A Transnational
Application of
U.S. Statutory Law
by D. W. Lenehan
In most situations where a U.S. industry is exempted from our anti-trust laws,
it tends to be closely scrutinized and directly accountable to a federal regulatory
agency. But what happens when an industry is international in scope, and its
very nature makes close scrutiny and direct accountability impossible? This is
the US. Maritime industry, vital to our
national interest, yet extending well beyond the recognized boundaries of US.
jurisdiction. It is not uncommon, for
example, to find a ship, registered in
Liberia and owned by a Greed consortium, carrying German industrial goods
between the Netherlands and the United
States. The situation becomes even
more complex when it is remembered
that French, Italian and Scandinavian
ships are also competing for the same
cargo over the same routes. Where
foreign ship owners mutually agree to
"price-fixing" arrangements, how are
US. owned ships to compete, effectively
in view of US. anti-trust legislation? The
brief answer is that they are exempted

from this legislation through a transnational application of US. maritime law.
To understand this exemption, it is
necessary to consider The Shipping Act
of 1916, (46 U.s.c. 801 et. seq.) and in
particular its sections which have the effect of regulating discriminatory practices in US. foreign Commerce.
The main purpose of this act is to articulate a scheme of government regulation which has as its objective the preservation of competition. This policy rests
on the basic assumption that the prosperity of our foreign commerce and the
maintenance of a strong and independent merchant marine can best be secured through strict administrative surveillance of shipping practices, insistence
on equal treatment for all shippers, protection of cargo and ports against unfair
discrimination, and finally through prevention of practices designed to eliminate smaller independent carriers. At
first glance, the terms of the act seem
diametrically opposed to the end it seeks
to achieve.
Section 15 requires that every written
or oral agreement between two or more
steamship lines, which in any way fixes
or regulates ocean freight rates, be filed
with the Federal Maritime Commission.
(It is important to note that the government does not set foreign commerce
rates, it merely accepts the rates for filing
and requires that the line charge only the
rate filed.) Any such agreement is made
effective and lawful upon approval by

the Commission. Indeed, the section
explicitly states that any such approval
exempts that activity from the provisions
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
The activities that this legislation
wished to protect in 1916 remain basically the same as are protected today.
These are the unique transnational business organizations known as steamship
conferences. Each conference is a contractually established cartel consisting of
a number of steamship lines serving the
same trade in the foreign commerce of
the United States. Protected by Section
15 of The Shipping Act, these conferences have as their purpose the elimination of price competition and to that end
possess a number of unusual powers.
Among these are the power to fix rates
by agreement (supra) and to enforce
these agreements by boycotts, fines and
expulsions of member lines.
In addition to the conferences, several
independent non-conference carriers
are found in almost all U.S. trade routes.
The act encourages their existence in
order to give the conferences realistic
competition and therefore influence the
conference rate-making. These independent carriers are also required to file
ocean freight tariffs in the same manner
as are the conferences. We, therefore,
find a situation where the ostensible goal
of a legislative enactment is to preserve
competition in our foreign commerce
while the method used to reach that end
is the sanctioning of multi-national organizations authorized to fix ocean
freight rates.
This paradox confronted the House
Committee on Merchant Marine &
Fisheries around the turn of the century,
and more recently, the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee, when it conducted extensive investigations of the Steamship Conference System. Nevertheless, every
government body which has come face
to face with the economic and political
realities of the steamship industry has
reached the same conclusion: the
Steamship Conference System is an absolute necessity.
This conclusion is derived from a review of a recurring pattern that has repeatedly made itself evident to inves-

tigators and students of the industry. The
steamship is a very expensive vehicle,
manned by a large and expensive crew.
Further, the recent advent of containerization, has necessitated a tremendous
capital outlay for large and expensive
cranes, as well as for a ground fleet of
containers and chasis. Consequently,
millions of dollars will be committed to a
voyage before a liner loads a single ton
of cargo into its holds or onto its decks. It
should also be emphaSized that basic
costs for the whole voyage are generally
fixed and do not significantly fluctuate
with the type or quantity of cargo carried. As another writer has noted,
"Prompt and certain disaster awaits the
line that puts its ship on the loading berth
and then fails to meet the fixed costs to
which it is committed." The House report of the 63rd Congress (1914) found
that " ... the entire history of steamship
agreements shows that in ocean coml11erce there is no happy medium between war and peace when several lines
engage in the same trade. Most of the
numerous conference arrangements
were the outcome of rate wars and represent a truce between the contending
lines." The committee concluded that
the elimination of conferences would
have either of two results:
1) the stronger carrier would destroy
the weaker, or
2) to avoid a costly struggle, carriers
would consolidate through common ownership.
In either case, a worse monopoly would
be created than, as we shall see, exists
with the conference system.
A close scrutiny of the House report
discussing The Shipping Act discloses a
pervasive notion that a judiciously
applied regulatory scheme would ultimately protect American shipping interests (and ultimately U.S. national interests) by creating an arena in which U.S.
lines could compete fairly against foreign
flag carriers. It also established that
American importers and exporters are
directly and adversely effected by unstable rate conditions. Generally, the small
or medium sized shipper is the loser during rate wars since the large shipper is
normally the beneficiary of low-rate
deals. However, both large and small

lose because the inability to accurately
predict freight rates results in Significant
problems in establishing sale prices.
The resolution of compulsive competition resulting in a monopoly of the
strongest among land-based American
industries such as railroads, communications and utilities was governmental
price regulation. However, the basic fact
of ocean shipping is that no single government can regulate ocean freight
rates. No government controls more
than one end of the journey, and only a
fraction of the carriers are its nationals.
Any regulation at one end of the journey
would inevitably either drive carriers
from the trade or more likely invite contradictory and even relatiatory regulation from the other. We have, chen, an
industry which, without price regulation,
cannot maintain the competitive viability
both industry and our national interest
require, yet which by its very nature
cannot be directly regulated by anyone
government.
In terms of The Shipping Act the main
problem arises in countries which have
laws that prohibit the export of private
business documents located within that
country for the purpose of determining
the basis for prosecution of their nationals in U.S. anti-trust matters. (It is the
documentary evidence - the written
word - which provides the raw information needed to reach a judicial determination to confirm or refute an alleged
violation.) In response to this situation,
The Shipping Act created the disarmingly simple solution of self-policing
within the Conference System. While
this is clearly not the whole answer, since
the practices of independent carriers
need to be regulated also, where, for
example, they illegally attempt to disrupt
the conference agreements by giving illegal rebates to shippers, the regulation
of these independents follows a different
path than does regulation of conference
members. Suffice it to say that this is
more in the area of diplomatic negotiations than a direct transnational application of U.S. law.
Section 15 of The Shipping Act places
the self-policing function, not only with
the conference itself, but also with
conference-appointed neutral bodies.
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Under this device, conference selfpolicing is effected through a permanent
agency appointed by the conference itself to independently investigate and adjudicate all complaints of malpractice.
These malpractices include all of the
prohibited practices contained in The
Shipping Act. The principal condition
precedent to approval of the selfpolicing arrangement is that the conference or the neutral body make periodic
reports to the Federal Maritime Commission describing all of its activities, indicating the types of violations discovered and the fines imposed. Conversely,
another important feature of Section 15
is that the Commission has the power to
disapprove or suspend any conference
agreement which does not practice
adequate self-policing. (This was recently referred to by the Commission
Chairman as the basic "quid-pro-quo"
of the U.S. sanctioning of the Conference System.)
A look at the nature of the current
neutral body for carriers operating between the United States and Europe, the
u.K. and Ireland shows a clear analogy
to a "Supranational" system. Its most
obvious features are its multi-national
composition and its ability to make decisions that are directly binding on carriers
without the intervention of governments. This latter feature is based on the
theory of individual consent (by member
lines) to conference actions derived from
the contractual origin of the conference.
The executive of the body, located in
London, is appropriately called the enforcement authority. The body was
created by an agreement approved by
the U.S., and functions under a constitution and by-laws. The authority has the
contractually established right to review
and investigate all allegations of malpractices, and to examine all records relevant to any investigation regardless of
where these documents are domiciled.
Indeed the very refusal to cooperate in
an investigation subjects a line to a
$5,000 fine for each week the refusal
continues. The authority may dismiss
the charge or set it for hearing. After a
hearing the authority serves on the accused line findings of fact and, if warranted, specifies fines. Maximum fines
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are $50,000 per violation, which must
be paid within fifteen days after service
of the authority's report.
The neutral body system of the conferences has created a desirable level of
rate stability in most trades, primarily because here the interests of industry and
government have converged to the
mutual advantage of both. Each has effectively chosen to accept less than its
optimum goal in return for assurances of
stability and continued beneficial returns. Shippers are assured of the predictable transportation rates essential to
realistically establish sale prices. In return, they give up the possibility of lower
but less predictable rates. In return for
being spared the cut-throat competition
that aims at their total destruction, individual carriers give up some of their ini!lependence to the conference, and,
with it, some of their increased profit potential. Likewise, the government, by allowing potential competitors to agree on
charges, is effectively backing down on
long standing principles of our anti-trust
law. However, in this way, the U.S. is
able to maintain the viability of her merchant marine through a transnational
application of U.S. maritime law.

•

Study Tips

From A
Therapist
by Robin Goodenough,
Professor of Law and Licensed
Psychologist

1. SPREAD IT, DON'T HUMP IT,
DON'T LUMP IT
The longer the period of time over
which you spread your learning, the better it will stick. Budget it neatly in equal
packages over the study period. Spread
it out. Distributed learning is far more effective than marathon learning massed
at the end. If you lump it, the lumps will
be on you.

2. YOUR MIND HAS UNLIMITED
STORAGE, FILL IT
What you know on the conscious level
is only the "tip ofthe iceberg." Although
the information is not on the tip of your
tongue, much is lying in the subconscious, alive and well and waiting to
bubble up. You have a vast
storehouse - feed it. It craves information. It's never too late to add more.
3. UP YOUR MEMORY CURVE
The memory curve descends like a
long, steep ski slope. Memory lingers
briefly at the top with high recall. Then it
slides into a steep plunge, leveling off at
roughly ten per cent. HOWEVER, it
takes very little effort to break the skid.
Even brief reviews bolster the memory
curve. A little effort gets you a lot of
memory. Spaced reviews can keep retention well over the fifty per cent mark.
4. REVIEW PAYS OFF FOR YOU
It pays handsomely to review right up
to test time. Beware of the misinformed
romanticist who urges you to take off a
day or a week before exams. This' 'salvation by relaxation" myth has no validity in learning. Just before exams let your
eyes run over your outline or over the
table of contents of your text. You may
not feel much, but something wonderful
is happening. Review BETWEEN
exams. Post-mortems and bull sessions
are counter-productive. A "once over
lightly" review pays off.
5. CRAM, CRAM, CRAM, RIGHT UP
TO THE EXAM
Cramming is very effective and has
saved many a career. Cramming jams in
new stuff and reinforces the old. Cramming helps give a sense of confidence to
counter the debilitating aura of guilt from
weeks of procrastination. Remember,
cramming is no substitute for planned
and distributed learning. But if you can
both budget your learning and slam
home with a good cram job, you will
break through a sure winner.
6. ROUTINES REIGN SUPREME
Set a' 'game plan" for yourself and follow it faithfully. Layout the subject matter and areas to be covered on a
schedule. Constantly revise the schedule
according to your results. If you are
normal, you will always fall short of your
expectations. Worry not!

